The doctrines of precedent of stare decisis 3 and jurisprudence constante 4 are fundamental ingredients of the evolution of judicially created rules. Although much attention has been given to the evolution of the Common law under a stare decisis principle (Heiner, 1986; Kornhauser, 1989; von Wangenheim, 1993) , legal evolution under alternative doctrines of precedent remains an open theoretical issue. To this end, we consider how legal rules may evolve under the precedential doctrine of jurisprudence constante in Civil law.
Current theories are unable to explain why, in spite of emphasis on legal certainty and stability, the practice of Civil law systems in certain areas of the law is often characterized by instability and uncertainty. Traditional explanations focus on the lack of stare decisis (Mattei, 1988) , different judicial cultures, political instability and different 1 George Washington University, Economics Department. 2 George Mason University, School of Law. We would like to extend our gratitude to Dan Milkove for his help and comments. All remaining errors are ours. 3 The legal doctrine of stare decisis (literally to stand by things that have been settled), implies that courts should adhere to past legal precedent on issues of law when deciding pending cases. 4 Jurisprudence constante doctrines hold that judges should only consider themselves bound to follow a consolidated trend of decisions. Judicial decisions do not become a source of law until they mature into a prevailing line of precedents (Lambert and Wasserman, 1929; Dainow, 1974; Dennis, 1993) . levels of separation of powers (Merryman, 1969) . This paper provides an explanation based on the dynamic process with which judicial precedents evolve.
We consider legal change under Civil law doctrines of precedent, contemplating different patterns of consolidation or corrosion of legal remedies in the law. Legal rules granting rights and legal protection may evolve over time and gradually consolidate into established legal entitlements. On the other hand, legal protection may be subject to gradual corrosion and certain forms of legal protection may be abandoned. 5 Finally, legal entitlements may enjoy a mixed level of recognition and such level of mixed protection may persist over time. We focus on conditions that may determine these alternative patterns of legal evolution.
Section 1 briefly introduces the theory of legal precedent from comparative and historical perspectives. Attention is given to the modern-day product of such evolution: the doctrine of jurisprudence constante. Although developed in a system that emphasizes certainty and stability, we suggest that this doctrine of precedent potentially leads to quite contrary results.
Section 2 proposes a model that evaluates the impact of jurisprudence constante on legal evolution in different litigation contexts. It highlights the interaction between established precedents and judicial fads in shaping future case law. It also explains the possible impact of exogenous shocks in the legal system on the evolution and stability of the law.
We formulate a simple model of path dependence in the law in which the rate of legal claims brought by plaintiffs in past cases affects the future state of the law. This formulation considers a legal system that specifies a minimum level of uniformity in case law. Any set of precedents that falls below such level of consistency is regarded as "split" case law and inconclusive as a source of law. Precedents that reach or surpass the required level of consistency become a persuasive source of law, affecting decisions for future similar cases. In this way, a large fraction of affirmative precedents on a specific legal issue (e.g., cases that recognize a new type of claim or cause of action) increases the probability that similar claims will be recognized in the future and a prevalence of negative precedents reduces the likelihood of a successful claim in future cases. In such a system, the state of the law is determined by the stock of established legal precedents and the flow of recent decisions. We elaborate on this simple framework to analyze features of legal evolution under different parameters of the problem. Most importantly, we show that the stability and change of legal precedent are affected by the institutional threshold of jurisprudence constante and the weights attached to established precedents and recent jurisprudential trends.
Section 3 concludes with a few summary considerations and suggestions for applications and future extensions.
'Jurisprudence Constante' and Civil Law Doctrines of Precedent
There are substantial historical and conceptual differences between the doctrines of precedent in Common law and Civil law traditions. Both legal traditions regard legal precedent as the presence of a sequence of consistent decisions in similar cases over time.
However, these principles operate differently in the two traditions.
The principle of precedent can first be identified at the end of the 16th century when English courts started to adhere to previous custom in matters of procedure and pleading (Berman and Reid, 1996: 446) . However, it was not until the 17th and 18th
centuries that a substantive rule of precedent developed in Common law systems. In that period, courts were entrusted with the task of "finding" the law, rather than "making" the law.
6
The presence of several cases recognizing the same legal principle increased the persuasive force of judicial findings: precedents became more authoritative when they were reaffirmed by a sequence of consistent decisions over time.
7
During the lateeighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, under Bentham's positivist influence, the doctrine of stare decisis moved from practice to principle, giving rise to the common law 6 According to Blackstone (1764) , the function of common law, which consists of the original common custom and the role of courts, was to find and declare such custom and to provide persuasive evidence of its content and existence. For further discussion, see Parisi, 1992, and Parisi and Depoorter, 2003. 7 In Hale's (1713) view, "a line of judicial decisions consistently applying a legal principle or legal rule to various analogous fact situations is 'evidence' of...the existence and the validity of such a principle or rule" (Berman and Reid, 1996: 448) .
notion of binding authority of precedent. By the end of the 19th century the concept of formally binding rules of precedent was established (Evans, 1987: 36-72) . The system of precedents was no longer viewed as persuasive evidence of the law, but itself became a primary source of law (Parisi and Depoorter, 2003) .
Most Civil law systems underwent quite a different evolution, relegating case law to the rank of a secondary legal source. Codes and special legislation were recognized as the only primary source of law.
8
In nineteenth century Europe, the doctrine of the separation of powers was understood to imply that " [t] he role of the courts is to solve disputes that are brought before them, not to make laws or regulations" (David, 1972: 180-181) . This strict historical conception of separation of powers was due to general distrust of courts that were manipulated by the king before the French revolution. The ideals of certainty and completeness in the law implied that legislative provisions had to be formulated and interpreted as mathematical canons to avoid any room for discretion or arbitrary decisions in the judiciary (Parisi, 1992) . However, European jurists gradually developed a healthy skepticism concerning the ideals of certainty and completeness in the codified law.
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As memories of the abuses of pre-revolution regimes began to fade, ideological concerns over the judiciary's role were assuaged. In their own judicial practices, civil law jurisdictions gradually adhered to a system of informal precedent law, where a sequence of analogous cases acquired persuasive force as a source of law. This judicial practice emerges as a way to promote certainty, consistency, and stability in the legal system that codifications had failed to achieve, while minimizing costs to administer justice.
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8 In France, the "only legitimate source of the law is 'the law" (Troper and Brzegorczyk, 1997: 107 (Troper and Brzegorczyk, 1997: 117) . 9 After the French revolution "the judicial function was conceived as a mere application of statutes, by way of syllogisms" (Troper and Grzegorczyk, 1997: 103) . These protections "enclosed [the judgment] within a constitutional framework which is intended to prevent it from ever becoming a rule of law" (Carbonnier, 1969: 95-96) . 10 A prominent European legal theorist, commenting on the notion of legal logic, cynically wrote: "I have to confess that, as time passes, my distrust for legal logic increases" (Calamandrei, 1965: 604 ). Calamandrei's distrust resurfaces in a number of recent legal analyses discussing the difficulties encountered in applying codified legal rules to an ever-changing pattern of factual circumstances (for further discussion, see Parisi, 1992) . 11 For an analysis of the precedential systems of jurisprudence constante in Civil law and Mixed jurisdictions, see Dennis (1993) , Dainow (1974) and Moreno (1995) . For a comparative study of the rule of This path of legal development gave rise to jurisprudence constante, the doctrine under which a court is required to take past decisions into account only if there is sufficient uniformity in previous case law. 12 No single decision binds a court and no relevance is given to split case law. Once uniform case law develops, courts treat precedents as a persuasive source of law, taking them into account when reaching a decision. The higher the level of uniformity in past precedents, the greater the persuasive force of case law. Considerable authoritative force therefore stems from a consolidated trend of decisions on any given legal issue.
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In modern legal systems, the doctrine of jurisprudence constante is followed in
France (Troper and Grzegorczyk, 1997) , Germany (Dainow, 1974) , Louisiana (Carbonnier, 1969; Dennis, 1993) , and other mixed jurisdictions (MacCormick and Summers, 1997) . In France, precedents that consolidate into a trend or a "persisting jurisprudence" (jurisprudence constante) become a source of law. There is no judicial practice of citing or expressly referring to a specific precedent, but a continuous line of precedents becomes a relevant, and often decisive, factor in judicial decision-making (Troper and Grzegorczyk, 1997) . " [C] ourts as well as scholars tend to recognize the existence of [a case] rule and the character of 'arrêt de principe' of the precedent when it has been followed by a line of others" (Troper and Grzegorczyk, 1997: 130) .
Along similar lines, Louisiana law provides that a precedent becomes a source of law when it has become "settled jurisprudence" (jurisprudence constante). As pointed out by Louisiana Supreme Court Justice James Dennis, when a prevailing trend of cases forms a stream of uniform and homogeneous rulings with the same reasoning, the doctrine accords the prevailing jurisprudence persuasive authority. The doctrine of jurisprudence constante allows future courts to take into account past jurisprudential trends and to justify reliance on such precedents in deciding future cases (Dennis, 1993) .
Likewise, Germany has adopted the notion that a line of decisions on a certain subject creates a sort of judicial custom. A prevailing line of precedent that has been standing for precedent, including Spain, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Germany, France, and the U.K., see MacCormick and Summers (1997) . 12 Indeed, as one distinguished legal writer states: "[t]he practice of the courts does not become a source of law until it is definitely fixed by the repetition of precedents which are in agreement on a single point" (Lambert, 1929: 14) .
some time is referred to as "permanent adjudication" (standige Rechtsprechung) (Dainow, 1974) . These examples are representative of a general tendency to accord persuasive force to a dominant trend of court decisions within civilian jurisdictions.
The following section models the evolution of case law under these doctrines of precedent, considering the possibility for consolidation, corrosion, and stability of legal rules. It will become clear how different variations of Civil law doctrines of precedent, in requiring different levels of consistency in past decisions, would affect the stability and evolution of the legal system
A Model of Legal Evolution under 'Jurisprudence Constante'
Law and economics scholars have formulated a variety of models to study the creation of precedents and evolution of the common law. Demand-side theories formulated by Rubin (1977) , Priest (1977) , Priest and Klein (1984) , Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) , and Fon, Parisi and Depoorter (2002) , hypothesize that cost analysis by the litigants influences legal change over time.
14 Similar results were reached by other scholars who focused on the supply-side of legal decision-making. Coase (1960), Ehrlich and Posner (1974) , and Posner (1994) concentrated on the role of the judiciary in shaping efficient common law rules.
15
Subsequent work by Fon and Parisi (2003) looked at the combined effects of these variables, studying the role of ideology and adverse selection in legal evolution. In their model, this selection mechanism was shown to potentially affect legal rules and remedial protection in the legal system.
16
Our model departs from previous contributions and does not commit to any specific view on the determinants of courts' substantive choices, but looks at ways in 13 Under French law, this doctrinal construction, also known as arret de principe, holds that a series of decisions, all in accord, give bearing to an established rule of law (Parisi and Depoorter, 2003) . 14 As noted in Priest and Klein (1984) , the set of disputes selected for litigation constitutes neither a random nor a representative sample of the set of all disputes: judges can only rule on cases they see. 15 Among the earliest contributors to this literature, see also Landes (1971) . 16 Fon and Parisi (2003) , building upon existing literature on the evolution of judicially created law, consider a model of legal evolution in which judges have varying ideologies and propensities to extend the domain of legal remedies and causes of action. The selection hypothesis advanced by Fon and Parisi differs from Priest and Klein (1984) and Hadfield (1992) . Along the lines of Rubin and Bailey (1994) , Fon and Parisi develop an alternative model of legal evolution which takes into account some important public choice components. However, while Rubin and Bailey focus on the role of lawyers in changing the law, Fon and Parisi consider the role of judges' ideology.
which the dynamics of legal evolution may differ under Civil law doctrines of precedent.
Whether courts' past decisions were affected by parties' case selection (demand-side theories), or judges' preferences (supply-side theories), past precedents affect future decisions. We thus study how the more gradual and softer impacts of precedents in Civil law jurisdictions affect the evolution of the law.
We consider how the degree of consistency in past case law and the likelihood of success in litigation could induce changes in legal systems. These factors explain some of the different patterns of evolution in the levels of remedial protection and the gradual consolidation or corrosion of legal principles. In examining jurisprudence constante doctrines, we look at two types of legal precedents. Negative precedents -those denying recognition to a filed claim or restrictively interpreting the scope of application of an existing statute -may consolidate into a negative jurisprudential rule that eliminates legal protection with respect to the legal issue. Positive precedents -those recognizing a filed claim or expansively interpreting the scope of application of an existing statute -may consolidate into a positive jurisprudential rule that grants legal protection in such a situation.
Under jurisprudence constante doctrines a judge is not bound by a single decision in a single previous instance.
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Authoritative force stems from a consolidated trend of decisions on a certain point. The practice of the courts becomes a source of law when it matures into a prevailing line of precedents. Under these doctrines of precedent, if the fraction of positive judgments (or the fraction of negative judgments) with respect to a legal issue exceeds a threshold, then recognition of such legal claims in future disputes will be facilitated (or made more difficult) by the presence of such consolidated case law.
18
This creates path dependence in the process of legal evolution, since a consolidated trend of past jurisprudential rulings affects the likelihood that such rulings will be perpetuated in future case law. We denote the threshold as π . Its value is greater than or equal to one half and is institutionally determined by the legal system. 17 For example, this is generally so in Louisiana state case law. Under the Supremacy Clause, however, Louisiana judges are sometimes bound by a single decision issued by the U.S. Supreme Court or Court of Appeals for the 5 th Circuit. 18 For example, a threshold B = 1/2 implies that a simple majority of precedents on a given legal issue is regarded as persuasive authority, increasing the chances of success for future similar cases.
In the face of any legal claim presented in court, a jurisprudence constante regime can therefore evolve in three possible ways. A claim may be accepted by a sufficiently large percentage of cases, giving rise to a dominant "positive" jurisprudence. A claim may be negated by a sufficiently large percentage of cases, establishing a dominant "negative" jurisprudence. Finally, if there is insufficient consensus in courts' decisions, jurisprudence is "split" and precedents do not influence future courts' decisions.
Even in the presence of jurisprudence constante, minority cases play an important informational role in Civil law decision-making. Unlike Common law systems, Civil law systems generally do not allow judges to attach dissenting opinions to majority decisions.
Minority cases, cases decided against a prevailing trend of decisions, thus become the main way in which judges can express views that are contrary to the prevailing jurisprudential trend. Minority cases therefore convey information that would otherwise remain buried under the opaque majority decision of the court.
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Although not directly applicable as a source of law, cases that do not conform to the dominant trend serve as a signal of emerging dissent among the judiciary. Although minority cases typically lose under appeal, we allow for these cases to play a signaling role, informally influencing future decisions.
We now consider a model of civil litigation. Litigants face a dispute where p is the probability of success for the plaintiff. In our terminology, this corresponds to the probability that a positive judgment is rendered. At period t − 1, let p t −1 be the probability for a plaintiff to see his claim recognized on grounds of law on a specific legal issue. In the next period t , we assume that the previous period probability has been realized, and becomes the fraction of cases that recognized a given category of legal claims during the last period. That is, at time t , p t is the current flow of cases that recognized a given category of claims. Let L t represent the fraction of total cases that recognized a given category of legal claims in all past periods. Thus, L t is the stock (in fraction) and p t is the flow (in fraction) of case law affirming remedies at time t .
Changes in the stock of affirmative case law in the future period depend on L t and p t . In particular, assume that In modeling the effect of jurisprudence constante, we allow judges to be influenced by both established case law (tradition) and recent jurisprudential trends and fads (fashion). We assume that change in the probability of success of any given category of legal claims is affected by the fraction of similar claims that successfully received relief in court in both recent and older case law, p t and L t . On the other hand, we also assume that past negative cases that rejected a legal claim presented to the court are important elements for reaching decisions in future similar cases as well. In other words, judges are also influenced by negative precedents that did not grant relief to the legal 
. This relative impact directly influences the probability of success for new cases filed. A larger influence of the relative impact of positive and negative cumulative case law γ π δ π
on the probability of success for future similar cases indicates that the legal system gives more deference to established jurisprudential tradition. For convenience, we refer to this relative impact of past case law as the jurisprudential tradition
Specifically, we assume that changes in the probability of obtaining recognition of a filed claim are a function of the judicial fashion variable and the jurisprudential tradition variable with the following property:
where http://law.bepress.com/alea/15th/art10 To understand the logic behind our model, first consider the case where positive case law dominates, L t ≥ π . Here, the number of cases that recognized a given category of legal claims substantially outweighs the number of cases that denied recognition to such claims. The dominance of positive precedents satisfies the institutional threshold π . In this situation, we postulate that the impact of positive case law is greater than the impact of negative case law γ π δ π To summarize our specification of the dynamic behavior of the probability p t to obtain recognition of a new filed claim qualitatively, we have the following:
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Now consider the dynamic behaviors of L t and p t with the help of the phase diagram in Figure 1 . From the dynamic equation (1) . It is represented by the point (
In the split case law region where neither positive case law nor negative case law dominates and 1− < < π π With the help of Figure 1 , it is now easy to see that starting from a point in the region of dominant negative case law below the 45° line, over time the dynamic path will approach the steady state located at the origin. Likewise, starting from a point in the region of dominant positive case law above the 45° line, over time the dynamic path will approach the steady state located at (1,1). In the region of uncertainty, starting from a point where both L t and t p fall between 1− π and π , the dynamic path will approach a steady state in the middle portion of the 45° line over time.
To further understand possible dynamic paths of case law under a doctrine of jurisprudence constante, take as a starting point A in Figure 
Figure 2: Some Possible Dynamic Paths in Civil Law Precedents
The consolidation of positive precedents can also be reached when the originating point is outside the region of dominant positive case law. Take for example point B (in . A short-term movement towards the southeast is created.
Due to this short-term movement, the fraction of negative precedents 1 − L t is gradually lowered until it crosses the institutional threshold π . (In Figure 2 , this is read as the path 
Conclusion
This Finally, this paper does not commit to any specific view on the determinants of courts' substantive choices. In reality, the cases that reach a final judgment often constitute a biased subset of the relevant disputes. Past decisions are affected by parties' case selection and judges' ideological preferences. The study of the effect of alternative doctrines of precedent on the evolution of the law can thus be valuably extended to consider possible interactions between the identified dynamics and other potential determinants of case adjudication.
